This paper analyzes the setting of a reform towards liberalization of FDI policies as a political compromise pressured by the lobbying of a domestic lobby and a foreign MNC lobby. Using a common agency model of lobbying, we show that, under specific conditions, the interest group's influence is not distortive for a critical distribution of supporters over non-supporters of the reform. Also, our political economy framework shows that exogenous provision of information on the beneficial effects of FDI liberalization paradoxically weakens the reform process.
Introduction
In recent decades, multinational corporations (MNCs) have increased their foreign direct investment (FDI) activities worldwide and developing countries have been the main destination. FDI is the international flow of firm-specific asset such as production technologies, managerial and organizational practices, and trademarked brands. Usually, MNCs realize FDI through the establishment of new production facilities, or the merger and acquisition of an existing firm. The literature has traditionally distinguished two motives for FDI. Resource seeking FDI refers to firms willing to reduce production costs by relocating production to foreign countries abundant in necessary inputs, such as labor or natural resources. Market seeking FDI sees firms entering countries to produce goods and services for local sales. This strategy aims at reducing the burden of trade barriers and transportation costs. During the period between 1990 and 2013, the amount of FDI inflows had jumped from 35,000 to 77,000 million dollars and their share directed to the developing nations was 52% of global FDI inflows in 2013 (UNCTAD [1] ). To explain such massive evolution in international economic flows, a vast literature has focused on how governments compete to attract FDI. Indeed, the democratization process occurring in the 1990s, with a large number of countries adopting free market economic policies, paved way for interstates competition to attract foreign investment. Indeed, FDI would yield infrastructure upgrading, promote technology transfer and improve managerial knowledge; those factors are of most importance to compete in global markets (Dunning [2] ). FDI are also credited with boosting economic growth (Alfaro et al. [3] ) and reducing unemployment (Spiezia [4] ;
Vacaflores [5] ). Such interstate competition has been witnessed mainly in developing countries as developed countries already exhibit high quality infrastructure, property rights protection and an educated work force, thus reducing the need for them to compete. Unsurprisingly, relaxing FDI regulation such as those on ownership, the creation of special economic zones, and lowering taxation on corporations have been widespread policies to attract FDI 1 . For instance, Kobrin [6] showed that during the period between 1992 and 2001, 95% of the 1086 individual policy changes either lessened restrictions on inflows of FDI or provided incentives to attract them.
However, interest groups' influence has been credited to be of great importance in shaping FDI policy changes. Using an original dataset of FDI regulation covering the period between 1962-2000 over 150 countries, 57 industries and 12 specific regulations that represent the most common barriers to FDI 2 , Pandya [7] found that industries in which firms invest to gain market access such as service industries are more likely to be restricted, as powerful domestic producers lobby for protection. FDI policies and regulations may thus serve as a way to protect the national economy. So far, this theoretical debate has been investigated by political economists who focused on the interaction between FDI and trade policy. It started with the seminal argument that foreign firms try to circumvent protectionist barriers that impediment exports sales via setting up local production (Corden [8] ). Other formulation refers to the quid pro quo FDI, where the motive for foreign investment is the pre-emption barriers that might otherwise be implemented (Baghwati [9] ) 3 . Dinopoulos and Wong [10] have shown that increased FDI by foreign entities will reduce protection threats against foreign imports in the host country. Quid pro quo investment is thus described as "indirect rent-seeking" via con- 1 The literature has focused on spatial econometrics to explore the extent of competition in tax, environmental standards, economic policy reforms, bilateral investment treaties and labor standards. The reader may refer to Cooray et al. [13] for an excellent survey of this literature. 2 The United Nations identifies sixty distinct policy measures that countries use to restrict FDI (UNCTAD [14] ). Pandya restricts his analysis to the following: bans on foreign ownership, majority local ownership requirements, government monopoly, mandatory joint ventures, compulsory investment pre-screening, local content requirements, minimum exports quotas, discriminatory tax policy, caps on capital and profit repatriation, limits on access to foreign exchange, local employment minimums and mandatory local representation on boards of directors. Note that the first five policy instruments listed above restrict FDI by limiting foreign investors' market access. The remaining seven are regulations that apply to foreign and not to nationally-owned firms.
sensual policies (Hillman and Ursprung [11] lighted that ideas matter in shaping citizens' attitudes towards free market policies in the U.S. Relying on questions from the General Social Surveys that ask respondents their opinions about the government's relationship to the economy, they found that where think tank spending is higher, citizens have more "pro-market" attitudes toward economic policy.
In this paper, we seek to unify these two dimensions of FDI politics within the framework of the common agency model of lobbying (Grossman and Helpman [22] ).
Contrary to conventional political economy models that assume citizens are rationally ignorant of the functioning of the economy and the impact of economic policies (Converse [23] ; Page and Shapiro [24] ; Deli et al. [25] ), we assume that the population exhibit heterogeneous political beliefs concerning international economic flows and in particular on the effects of FDI liberalization policies. In doing so, we fill a methodological gap highlighted by Rodrik [26] who insists on the necessity to account for ideas and beliefs in political economic modelling. The main contribution of the paper is to
show that information provision related to the beneficial effects of FDI liberalization policies may paradoxically lead to less liberalization. This counter-intuitive result lies with the structure of the political economy setting and interdependence effects between lobbies' activities and the evolution of citizens' beliefs.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the framework of our model in which we consider that society is not homogeneous with respect to citizens' beliefs over the effects of FDI liberalization policies. In Section 3, we develop the common agency
model of lobbying. We analyze the setting of the reform in FDI policies as a political compromise pressured by interest groups. The latter are composed of a domestic industry lobby and a foreign MNC lobby that have opposed interests. They both lobby the government by offering political campaign contributions. In Section 4, we investigate the policy distortion resulting from interest groups' influence by comparing the equilibrium level of policy change with its socially optimal value. We show that interest groups' influence may not be socially distortive under certain conditions. Section 5 explores the exogenous effect of information provision on the equilibrium level of FDI policy change. The last section presents some concluding remarks.
The Model
In this section we develop the assumptions of our basic economic model. We describe the utility functions and their arguments. In the spirit of Tagkalakis [28] and Jaeck and
Kim [29] , we formulate the unemployment equation as follows:
where u is the unemployment rate; w is the nominal wage; and π is the inflation rate. Note that w π − represents the real wage. We assume that there is a level of FDI policies, ε , that corresponds to the current level of FDI rules and regulations which is normalized to 1 so that its log is zero. Therefore, ε ∈ +∞ and 0 v ε ∂ ∂ > . Such indices consider FDI policies that affect foreign investors' market access 6 . The liberalization process is specified as a continuous variable; when v increases, the liberalization process becomes stronger. The parameter a measures the impact of 6 As an example, and building on Pandya [7] , we assume that FDI regulations subjected to the softening process are related to bans on foreign ownership, majority local ownership requirements, mandatory joint ventures, or compulsory investment pre-screening. the real wage, (a > 0) and δ measures the impact of FDI liberalization policies ( 0 δ > ). This latter assumption is supported by empirical evidence showing the positive impact of FDI in reducing the unemployment rate in Latin America (Vacaflores [5] ), Central Europe (Radosevic et al. [30] ), the Czech Republic (Dinga and Munich [31] ) and in Italy (Spieza [4] ). Therefore, the unemployment rate increases with the real wage ( w π − ) and decreases with the index v (i.e. deviation from the current state of rules and regulation of FDI; so if v = 0, no FDI liberalization policy is undertaken).
The population is composed of N citizens. Following Caplan [19] 's empirical contribution we assume that there are two types of citizens: those who believe in the benefi- . The representative utility function of an informed citizen is given by:
This representative informed citizen believes in the positive effects of liberalization on the level of unemployment. When the deregulation process increases, the unemployment rate decreases, and thus the utility increases. This is represented by The representative utility function of a misinformed citizen is represented by:
The representative misinformed citizen does not believe in the beneficial effect of FDI liberalization policies leading to a misconception of the unemployment rate . When FDI liberalization process increases, the unemployment rate increases, and thus the utility decreases. This is 7 Based on the Survey of Americans and Economists on the Economy from Harvard University, Caplan [19] found that citizens would have an "anti-foreign" bias leading them to underestimate the benefits from free trade. We assume that such biased perception may also hold for the benefits of FDI liberalization policies. 8 This assumption contrasts with the seminal standard assumption of citizens' rational ignorance that prevails in the public choice literature. The question of the origin of biased beliefs is left out of the paper. Biased beliefs may result from exposure to activist groups (Saint-Paul [32] ; Jaeck [33] ) or ideology (MacDonald and Rabinowitz [34] ). 9 The assumption is in line with the seminal results of MacCulloch et al. [35] who showed that individual happiness increases when the unemployment rate decreases. 10 This assumption is motivated by Caplan [19] 's empirical evidenced demonstrated an "anti-foreign bias" as well as Scheve and Slaughter [18] showing that individuals are less supportive of FDI if they perceive their jobs to be insecure. 
The Political Process
In this section we develop the political model which is based on the common agency framework (Grossman and Helpman [22] ). We characterize how interest groups' influence affect the political equilibrium. We consider two competing firms that operate in the service industry and produce the same good. The formation of the FDI policies easing market access in the home country is subject to the influence of interest groups.
For methodological purpose, we first assumed that no external information on the beneficial effects of FDI liberalization policies is undertaken, therefore ( )
given. A domestic and a foreign MNC that belong to the home and foreign country, respectively, from distinct lobbies j, with j=d; f representing the domestic and foreign lobby respectively. Each lobby offers political contributions to the government. This money is for 'direct political influence' as it supports the electoral campaign for the reelection of an incumbent government 12 . As a reward, lobbies expect to obtain a better access to the legislator (Grossman and Helpman [22] ). In our case, both lobbies are concerned with the degree of liberalization of FDI policies, ( ) v ε , but with opposed interests, and therefore, compete for influence. The domestic lobby supports a low level of liberalization as it seeks protection from competing foreign investors 13 . On the other hand, the MNC lobby supports more liberalization as it seeks market access. Following
Olson [36] , we also assume that citizens (informed and misinformed) are too numerous to overcome the free-rider problem and as such they do not organize themselves into a lobby group. To examine how political contributions provided by lobbies affect the equilibrium level of FDI policies, we use a common agency model of lobbying (Grossman and Helpman [22] ) which is a two-stage game. The timing of the game can be expressed as following: In the first stage, each lobby presents to the government a contribution schedule, s(v), which is contingent upon the level of FDI policies chosen by the government. In the next stage, the government sets the liberalization policy and collects the political contributions. Analyzing the determination of the political equilibrium requires first to define the aggregate welfare of each lobby j.
The domestic lobby's gross welfare function is represented by the domestic firm 11 This assumption is motivated by Pandya's [21] study that relies on the annual public opinion survey conducted in 18 Latin American countries. Results clearly indicate that attitudes in favor of FDI increase with the level of education. 12 IDEA [37] lists 41 countries with bans or other forms of restrictions on foreign donations to political parties. This includes the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Canada, and Argentina. However, there are some examples of countries which do not impose bans such as Australia, Colombia, Denmark and Germany (Aidt and Hwang [38] ). Gawande et al. [39] ) have shown that foreign lobbies significantly impact the setting of tariffs and non-tariff trade barriers in the U.S. and that foreign activity may be welfare-enhancing. 13 This assumption is in line with Pandya [7] 's results showing that industries in which firms invest to gain market access such as service industries are more likely to be restricted, as powerful domestic producers lobby for protection. . Each lobby sets up its contribution schedule so as to maximize its net welfare, which is the difference between the gross welfare and its contributions. Then, the government chooses the policy that maximizes a weighed sum of the aggregate social welfare and the received contributions. Following Grossman and Helpman [22] we assume that contribution schedules are globally truthful as they reflect everywhere the lobby's true welfare (Bernheim and Winston [40] ). With this global truthfulness assumption, the political equilibrium is the solution of a program in which the government seeks to maximize an objective function, which is the sum of the aggregate social welfare W and the interest of the active lobbies. It is such that 16 : 
where i W is the informed citizen's aggregate welfare equal to:
And m W is the misinformed citizen's aggregate welfare equal to: 14 Aitken, Harrison, and Lipsey [41] evidenced declining productivity for local firms competing with MNC as they face increased production costs due to greater labor demand. 15 These assumptions are in line with FDI's negative effects for local firms such as loss of market share due to increased foreign competition (Chari and Gupta [42] ). 16 The objective function of the government without considering the global-truthfulness assumption would be as follow,
If one considers the global-truthfulness property, the original objective function is re-written as Equation (6). Differentiating Equation (6) with respect to v, we obtain the first-order condition of government optimization: hance the MNC to expand its production. Equation (10) shows that the political equilibrium level of FDI policy change is chosen as a compromise between political contributions from interest groups and social welfare.
Political Equilibrium Policy
In this section, our primary focus is to compare the two equilibria ( v will provide us with a better understanding of the distortion resulting from direct political influence. Using Equation (7) and rearranging, we first set out the socially optimal level of FDI policy change, which is the solution of the following first-order condition
with ( ) ( )
The second order condition requires that 0 vv W < . Equation (11) shows that relaxing ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 
In (13), with the second order condition 0
is positive (negative), the equilibrium level of FDI policy change is higher (lower) than the social optimum. It is equal, and
When the MNC is the only one lobbying actively, the equilibrium level is higher than the optimal level. Similarly, if 0, 0
When the domestic lobby is the only one lobbying actively, the equilibrium level is lower than the optimal level. These results are expected. We consider the particular case where the two lobbies have the same political efficiency, such
Combining (12) and (13), we get:
From Equation (14), the following proposition shows the relationship between Corollary: The equilibrium level is higher than its socially optimal value if this ratio falls below the critical value A. It is lower than the optimal level if the ratio increases above A. These results hold everything else being equal. 
The Effect of Information Provision
In this section, we investigate the effect of an exogenous provision of information regarding the beneficial effects of FDI liberalization, µ , on the equilibrium level of FDI liberalization policy. We assume that such external information may come from different sources of the civil society such as think tanks for instance. Since
By differentiating v G with respect to, we obtain: 
Conclusions
Recognizing that the political economy of FDI demand has so far received less attention as opposed to the study of FDI supply, this paper has proposed a challenging analysis seeking to unify these two dimensions of FDI politics. Using a common agency model of politics, we have proposed a modelling of a reform aimed at relaxing FDI policies that account for the impact of direct lobbying of a domestic lobby and a foreign MNC lobby which compete for influencing the FDI policy process affecting firms' market access. The domestic lobby supports a low level of liberalization as it seeks protection from competing foreign investors. On the other hand, the MNC lobby supports more liberalization at it seeks market access. Contrary to conventional political economy models, we have assumed that the population exhibits heterogeneous political beliefs over the effects of FDI liberalization policies.
Our general model has suggested interesting results under specific conditions. First, proposition 1 has shown that when interest groups have the same lobbying efficiency, the lobbies' influence is not necessarily distortive. Indeed, taking into account the heterogeneity of citizen's beliefs over the effects of FDI policies, the equilibrium level of policy change is equal to its socially optimal value for a specific distribution of in- 
